This essay explores the critical idioms of Louis Althusser and his relations with Marxism and structuralism. I will particularly discuss Althusser’s most cited chapter from his book Lenin and Philosophy (1971) titled “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)” in the Humanities and the Social Sciences. In the end, I will attempt to discuss how post-structuralists used his idioms as take-off towards the establishment of a new critical tradition.
Much of Althusser’s structural influence comes from Claude Levi-Strauss, particularly Strauss’ concept of the binary oppositions. Althusser’s prime distinction between ideologies and ideology may be subsumed as his version of opposition. Marxism is historical and social. Althusser does not dismiss this theoretical position. But in pursuing Marxism, he introduces ideologies instead of ideology as the historical and social. Althusser elicits “ideology has no history” (120). For Marx, there is only ideology – that which is created by the mode of production or particularly that mode of production based on the economic condition of the society. Breaking ideology into several ideologies, Althusser argues that ideology is not only based on any economic principle. Christian ideology, political ideology, familial ideology, feminist ideology and queer ideology are some examples of ideologies.
Ideology for Althusser is the structured and generic content of ideologies. This association with structure is analogous to the concept of hegemony that Antonio Gramsci theorizes in his Prison Notebooks. In Gramsci’s discourse, hegemony as a form of domination (with consent) is the structure that makes members of the society believe that what they believe are real and true. This domination is always empirically linked with the state (Bennett et al. 1980). Ideology in the Althusserean sense is paralleled to the concept of language in the Saussurean sense. Language is systematic and structured. It has its own grammar and set of rules. The grammar and the rules are always inhabited in us. Most of the time, we tend to believe that language speaks us, instead of us speaking language. Language gives us this belief that we are in charge of it. Saussure (2010) explains, the grammar of any language dictates the way the language is used. Ideology, like language, gives us the illusion that we speak or control it. Ideology always makes us believe that we freely choose to believe the things we believe. As Althusser asserts, “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of the individuals to their real conditions of existence” (123).
This argumentation associates Althusser with psychoanalysts like Sigmund Freud and particularly Jacques Lacan. Ideology as a structural concept is linked with the subconscious. Althusser implies that the content of ideology, like in the subconscious may vary (ideologies are always different). It can be filled up with anything (i.e. Christian ideology, queer ideology, feminist ideology, postcolonial ideology) but the form will always remain the same. And like psychoanalysis, ideology always works unconsciously which will be discussed shortly.
Structuralism believes in an underlying principle of universalism in all societies and cultures. Ideology is the universal for Althusser and ideologies are the differing modes of understanding societies and cultures. Looking at the same discourse on language, Saussure posits that language is divided into two categorical inquiries: the langue and the parole. Langue, as the sum of word images stored in the minds of all individuals or the content of language itself, is similar to the Althusserean ideology. Parole, as the grammar, is a good analogy for ideologies.
Another important structural link in this discourse is Althusser’s critical interrogation on the concepts of the state and subjects as co-relations within a system. Like the structural method, Althusser is interested on the relationship and the derivative of “meanings” between the aforementioned concepts. For example, Singapore as a state and Singaporeans as subjects may be considered as one system. The Philippines as a state and the Filipinos as subjects is another system. Like in the structural approach, each system has its own governing structure. This governing structure is always dependent on the relationship and differentiation of all elements within the system. Althusser inquires how the state functions to its subjects and how the subjects function in accordance to the state. Considering that Singapore (as a nation-state) is a complete system, Althusser asks: why Singaporeans (as subjects) obey the state (Singapore as a state)? Why Singaporeans (as subjects) follow the laws produced by the government (the state)? Linking it with Marxism, particularly with Gramsci, Althusser inquires, why subjects (i.e. Singaporeans) apparently embrace capitalism without questioning it.
As mentioned earlier, Althusser does not dismiss capitalism. For him, capitalism is inevitable because its development is vis-à-vis the rise of modern nation-state. Following Marx and Gramci, Althusser is convinced that the state determines its mode of production. To keep this determination, the state inscribes a certain mode of governance that will give its subjects the illusion that what it does is always for the betterment of everyone. This institutionalization of governance does not guarantee the protection of its constituents but it is formed to protect its own interests. Capitalism is always argued to be the modern nation-state’s chosen mode of production. Democracy is always argued to be co-terminus with capitalism. For this reason, Althusser implies that state, capitalism and democracy are all co-terminus. Democracy is always defined in its classical sense as the government of the people, for the people and by the people. Althusser is probably skeptic about this pronouncement. He implies that democracy gave birth to the illusion of equality among all constituents. Following Althusser, constituents of democratic nations are always unequal particularly looking at the relations of labor and power. More concretely, Althusser states “we know that the reproduction of the material conditions of production cannot be thought at the level of the firm, because it does not exist at the level in its real conditions” (101). In this case, Althusser does not dismiss the Marxist concern about economic exploitation in capitalism (or exploitation in general). But despite of this, the constituents always behave in accordance to the State.
Althusser discusses that there are two mechanisms why constituents behave this way: the Repressive State Apparatuses (RSA) and the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA). These mechanisms also explain why people act accordingly to the rules of the state even though in a deeper analysis, these rules are not necessarily the best interests of everyone. Following Marx, RSA’s are machines of repression (106) enabling the ruling class to continue their domination over their subjects. Althusser’s examples of the RSA’s are police, the courts, the prisons, the armies, the constitutions and the laws. Like the physical behavior or subjection of the working class with their employers in the Marxist political economy, the constituents of a state are forced to physically behave and be subjected by laws, regulations, etc. However, Althusser asserts that looking at the RSA as the end-all principles of “domination and dominated” is too simplistic. Therefore, “a further supplementary theoretical development” (109) is needed to extend social analysis outside political economy.
Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) is Althusser’s response to the classical Marxist approach. Althusser is convinced that “repressive suggests that the State Apparatus in question functions by violence” (110). Repression is also manifested in non-physical or non-violent forms. ISA’s are non-physical forms of repressions. They are institutions creating ideologies, which individuals internalize and act without question or in accordance with. They create values, which oftentimes assert themselves to be at the core of the society. This is where the repressive part comes in. Althusser cites various examples of ISA’s: the system of the different Churches, the system of the different public and private schools, family, law, political systems, labor-unions, culture and the arts, and mass communication.
Nonetheless, the more important part of his analysis is the inquiry on the process of repression from these ISA’s. Althusser also reflects the reason behind the necessity to believe in the ISA’s. As mentioned earlier, Althusser does not deny capitalism as part of the dynamics of societies and cultures. The ISA’s function as masks to hide the capitalistic exploitations of the state. Althusser comments, the ISA’s repressive function “functions by ideology” (111).
As earlier discussed, Althusser considers ideology as something which is stored in the subconscious by the different ISA’s and produces what sort of things we believe. In pursuing this argument, he provides us with two theses: (1) ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence and (2) ideology has a material existence.
The first thesis was already explored when I discussed Althusser as a structuralist. In addition, Althusser posits the need to recognize the imaginary representation of the real. He explains this necessity by proposing two simple answers. In the history of European societies, the priests or despots forged “the Beautiful Lies so that, in the belief that they were obeying God, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are usually in alliance in their imposture, the Priests acting in the interests of the Despots or vice versa” (123 – 4). Two pragmatic reasons are inferred here: for the ruling class to continue ruling and for the people not to recognize the real condition of their existence (i.e. suffering) from the hands of the ruling elites.
The second answer is aligned with Marx’ concept of alienation. Althusser explains that the material alienation of the real conditions prompts individuals to create representations distancing themselves from the real conditions of their existence. This is similar to the famous Marxist dictum, “religion as the opium of the people.” But for Althusser, it is not the institution or the ruling class that creates the illusion but individuals themselves. Althusser points out, “it is not their real conditions of existence, their real world, that ‘men’ ‘represent to themselves’ in ideology, but above all it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there. This relation is at the “centre of every ideological i.e. imaginary, representation of the real world” (124 – 125). Individuals create narratives convincing themselves that their existence (or the relationship between the imagined world and the real world) is not so bad at all. In doing so, they alienate themselves a little bit further more. This sort of doubling distancing is like a drug keeping individuals away from the pain of alienation.
Althusser explains that the real world is never objectively out there as suggested by classical philosophers. It is a product of the individuals’ relationship to it, and the ideological representations individuals create about it. In other words, the stories we narrate as real become real. For example, in a family of medical doctors and lawyers, my being part of the academe is eccentric. I had to create my own stories to convince my family and myself that there is value in being an academic. But there is also a sense of exploitation here – the university where I am part of is “exploiting” my intellectual labor by demanding me to produce publications every two years, to engage in administrative work and to teach 12 hours a week. Yet, my salary cannot be compared to the salary that my cousins receive as medical doctors and lawyers. Because of this, I have in a way constructed sense of meaning or sense of value (ideology) in my position as a low-paying university instructor that will mask my real conditions (i.e. exploitation). I say that being part of the national university is a privilege because I receive a social status as compared to my cousins. Therefore, the respect and recognition are beyond the economic fulfillment that my cousins are getting. This principle is my sort of ideology to help me go on with my life in the university. It also consents the exploitation of my intellectual labor.
Althusser’s second thesis, “ideology has a material existence,” (125) is another extension of Marx. Rituals (i.e. church services or the Mass in the Catholic tradition) and behaviors (i.e. stopping before the stop light when the red light is on) manifested by these ideologies may be considered as good examples of ideology’s material existence. Althusser explains “we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness,’ and believing in the ‘ideas’ that his ‘consciousness’ inspires in him and freely accepts, must ‘act according to his ideas’, must therefore inscribe his own ideas as a free subject in the actions of his material practice” (126 – 127).
More importantly, Althusser discusses the idea of the subject (or individual) as the central material force of ideology. As he points out, “there is no practice except by and in an ideology; there is no ideology except by the subject and for the subject” (128). That subject – in a person is a material in itself. Althusser is telling us that there are no ideologies (or belief systems?) unless someone believes in them and enacts them.
Here, Althusser explains how a subject (individual) is constituted in ideology and how ideology constructs the notion of the self (or identity): the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology only in so far as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects (129, italics provided). In positing that individuals are subjects-in-ideology, Althusser explains that individuals are “always-already subjects” (130, italics provided). We are born as subjects (i.e. our parents gave our names, our gender and sexuality is subject to whether we have penis or not). But more so, Althusser asserts, “all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete subjects” (130, italics provided).
Interpellation is hailing. Ideology, in effect, hails to us. When we respond to clarify if it was indeed us being hailed, it answers back saying, “yes, you!” Several television advertisements are interpellating. An advertisement of a diet pill in the Philippines stated, “you need not hide anymore; you can already wear your swimsuit . . .” The advertisement seems to address me personally. It is interpellating – hailing and making me believe that the diet pill is in fact a necessity because it gives me this ideology that being fat is a social sore in the eyes.
Althusser makes some final notes on ideology by citing the Christian Religious Ideology as an example. Here, Althusser presents how individuals are transformed into subjects-in-ideology or how ideology specifically interpellates individuals. Most importantly, Althusser tells us that interpellation presupposes the existence of a unique and a central “other” Subject with a capital “S” – the source or the origin of a system or a structure. This creation of a source is very important for Althusser because when ideology hails us as subjects, we start to think that these ideologies (or ideas) addressed to us are absolute truths. In this example, he notes how Christian ideology has interpellated its congregation the idea of God as an ultimate Subject or the source, in which members of this congregation always return to in accordance to the justification of Christian laws, commandments, etc.
It is interesting to note that Michel Foucault was Althusser’s student. Foucault was also interested with the idea of power. But unlike his teacher, Foucault’s take-off was on the different power-relations and different forms of power outside the boundaries of the state. At the same time, his introduction of agency in opposition to the concept of ideological hailing may be considered to be an instance against structure (i.e. ideology). Foucault (1982) discusses that individual, when placed in relations of production and of signification, “is equally placed in power relations, which are very complex” (778). Foucault also asserts, that in these complex relations, individuals are not always in a struggle against oppression and exploitation. As he elicits, it is also important to recognize the struggle against the self and the submission to others (781).
Post-structuralists like Foucault and Jacques Derrida recuperate the concept of the individual and interrogate the concept of structure. Foucault seems to suggest that the individual in the method of hailing is undermined. Foucault is seemingly dubious of ideology as always hailing (i.e. television advertisement). What is the certainty that we are really hailed? Like the case of the diet pill commercial, why is it that despite of its continuous direct addressing of me, I have not bought a single pill.
On the other hand, ideology in Althusser appears to be a centre that holds the system or structure together. It may be inferred that ideology is a structural centre holding the state and its constituents together. Ideology may be argued to be Althusser’s obsession with “the structurality of structure” (Derrida 2007: 217). But nonetheless, Althusser can also be considered as the prophetic voice of a post-structural discourse. Jacques Derrida explains that the idea of the center is useful in a sense that it makes us realize the illusion of stability. Althusser’s ideology has shaken the idea of stability as it provides a room to discover illusions. But nonetheless, his discourse on the necessity for the absolute subject (i.e. his example on the Christian Religious Ideology) provides a centre. In this example, the idea of a centre appears to be a transcendental signified which cannot be represented or substituted by any adequate signifier. It appears that, Althusser embraces that there is a necessity for an ultimate source of meaning in a creation of an orderly system. Hence, Althusserean concept of ideology (although it talks about illusion) may be understood as the source or origin of stability in a society.
References
Althusser, Louis. 1994. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Ivestigation)” in Mapping Ideology. Slavoj Zizek (ed.), 100 – 140. London and New York: Verso Press.
Bennett, Tony et al. 1980. Culture, Ideology and Social Processes. London: Batsford.
Derrida, Jacques. 2007. “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” in Jacques Derrida: Basic Writings. Barry Stocker (ed.), 217 – 234. London and New York: Routledge.
De Saussure, Ferdinand. 2010. “Course in General Linguistics.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd edition. Vincent B. Leitch et al (eds.). 845 – 866. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company.
Foucault, Michel. 1982. “The Subject and Power” In Critical Inquiry 8 (4), 777 – 795.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 2010. “From The German Ideology.” In The Norton Anthology of Theory and Criticism, 2nd edition. Vincent B. Leitch et al (eds.), 655 – 657. New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company.
